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The New Biology and International

Sharing-Lessons From the Life and Work of
George P. Smith, II
THE HONORABLE JUSTICE MICHAEL

KIRBY, AC CMG"

[The George P. Smith, II, Distinguished Visiting Professorship-Chair
of Law and Legal Research endowment was establishedby George P.
Smith to broaden students' exposure to scholarsandjudgesof national
andinternationalreputationandto allow distinguishedvisitingscholars
the opportunity to do research at Indiana University and share their
ideas with the faculty and students of the Indiana University School of
Law and Indiana University. George P. Smith, an Indiana native,
received his B.S. degree in business, economics, and public policy in
1961 from Indiana Universityand his J. D.from the Indiana University
School of Law in 1964. He was awarded an LL.M from Columbia
University in 1975 andan HonoraryDegreefrom IndianaUniversity in
1998. George P. Smith has been a professor of law at The Catholic
University ofAmerica, in Washington, D.C., since 1977.
To inauguratethis endowment, the HonorableMichael D. Kirby of the
High Court ofAustraliadelivered the following lecture on January26,
2000. Justice Kirby received his B.A., LL.M, and BEc from Sydney
University and is internationallyrecognizedforhis work in bio-ethics,
human rights, and international law. In 1991, Justice Kirby was
awardedthe Australian Human Rights Medal. He currently serves as
the president of the InternationalCommission ofJurists.]

* Justice of the High Court of Australia. One-time Chairman of the Australian Law Reform
Commission and member of the World Health Organization (WHO) Global Commission on
Acquired Immuno Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS).
Member of the International Bio-ethics
Committee of UNESCO. Member of the Ethics Committee of the Human Genome Organization.
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I. PRESCIENT PROPHET OF THE NEW BIOLOGY'

Professor George Smith is a devoted alumnus of Indiana University. In his

name, the University has conferred on him the degree of Doctor of Laws
honoris causa.2 Now it has established a Chair of Law and Legal Research
that bears his name. I have come from the other side of the world to give this
lecture to help inaugurate the new chair.
I have done so because of two decades of friendship with Professor Smith
and respect for his "truly awesome" writings.' But I have also taken this long
journey to make it clear that this native of Wabash and graduate of Indiana
University is honored far away, as well as close to home. He is, as Balfour

said of Joseph Chamberlain, "no mere man of the hour. He is a man of
tomorrow and the day after tomorrow." As his students at the Catholic
University of America wrote in the Journalof ContemporaryHealth Law
andPolicy,4 in a volume dedicated to his name, Professor Smith exhibits an

"indefatigable spirit and sense of total commitment"' to "high standards of
professionalism and his unstinting devotion to his students." 6 Indiana
University, honoring him with the Distinguished Alumni Award as long ago as
1985, extolled his prodigious energy and uncompromising principles, saying,
"his inquisitive mind is constantly searching to expand his horizons and those
of the legal community" by "his unstinting labors."7
George Smith's fellow citizens in Indiana have done well to celebrate the
work ofthis remarkable legal professor and scholar. Astonishingly enough, he
has maintained his prodigious output since the days of his youth, and there is
no hint of a decline in his energy. One colleague commented that a day in
George Smith's life was not the same if he did not write three thousand words
in final form.8 On a good day (i.e., one that is cloudy, overcast, or raining) he
has been known to write as many as eight thousand words. What irritates
mere mortals of hesitant disposition is the amazing way in which George Smith
combines the highest of scholarly rigor with deliberate intellectual provocation,
the exploration of dark corners of present and possible future scientific
1. See Raymond C. O'Brien, The World ofLaw, Science and Medicine According to George
P. Smith, H,8 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 163, 181 (1992).

2. Conferred May 9, 1998.
3. See O'Brien, supra note 1,at 182.
4. The Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy was established by George Smith, II.
5. O'Brien, supra note 1,at I.

6. Id.
7. Id. at 2.
8. Id. at 165.
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developments, and the quest for solutions in the law that will be necessary if
we are to cope adequately with the dilemmas of contemporary science and
technology.9
It is now well established that, in recent years, there has been a decline in
published essays and speeches by U.S. judges. However, there are some
exceptions. For example, Chief Judge Richard Posner (whose output gives
even Professor Smith a challenge) seems partly intent upon single-handedly
filling the void occasioned by the reticence of others.'0 The usual explanation
for this reticence is the concern felt by some individuals with an eye on a
Supreme Court vacancy that their writings will affect their nomination (arising
from the political analysis of the extra-judicial writings of Judge Bork which
ultimately led to the rejection of his nomination to the highest court)."I In my
view, the real explanation is that few judges could rival the engaging titles
chosen by contemporary academics for their law review contributions.
Fewer still could challenge George Smith in this connection. The titles of
his essays are obviously designed to capture attention and to challenge the
reader to read further. A few illustrations will be sufficient to make this point.
Take, for example, the following titles: Stop, in the Name of Love!; 12 From
Cutlass to Cat-O-Nine Tails;'3 Patient Dumping: Implications for the
Elderly;4 Reviving the Swan, Extending the Curse of Methuselah;5
Murder She Wrote, Or Was it Merely Selective Non-Treatment?;16 All's
7
Well That Ends Well: Toward a Policy of Assisted Rational Suicide;"
Lost Horizons, Captains Courageous and Disabled Newborns;8
Intimations of Immortality;19 The Ice Person Cometh: Cryonics and the

9. Id. at 181.
10. See, e.g., Richard Posner, An Affair or State, 1999 reviewed ABA Journal,Nov. 1999, at

98.
11. See S. Scott Gaille, Publishingby United States Court of Appeals Judges: Before and Afler
the Bork Hearings,26 J. LEGAL STUD. 371 (1997).
12. 19 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 55 (1990).
13. From Cutlass to Cat-O-Nine Tails: The Casefor InternationalJurisdictionof Mutiny on
the High Seas, 10 MICH. J. INT'L L. 277 (1989).
14. 6ELDERL. J. 165 (1998).
15. Reviving the Swan, Extending the Curse of Methuselah, or Adhering to the Kevorkian
Ethic?, 2 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHiCS 49 (1993).
16. Murder,She Wrote or Was it Merely Selective Nontreatment?, 8 J.CONTEMP. HEALTH L. &
POL'Y. 49 (1992).
17. All's Well That Ends Well: Toward a Policy of Assisted Rational Suicide or Merely
EnlightenedSelf-Determination?,22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 275 (1989).
18. 1 Reports Seventh World Congress on MedicalLaw 75 (1985).
19. (1983) 6 U. N.S.W.L.J. 119.
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Law;20 The Razor's Edge of Human Bonding;2 For Unto Us a Child is
Born-Legally;22 and Through a Test Tube Darkly.23 These works are but
a few; there are dozens more. They display the author's love of literature and
poetry and his utter rejection ofquiet orthodoxy and temperate understatement.
Readers know from the headline that this is, as his students have averred, a
dramatic communicator24 who rejects the studied understatement of most
disciples of the law. Whereas he has learned lessons from the banners of the
tabloids, the content of his writings into which we are so provocatively drawn
is rigorous and scholarly. Yet, it never forsakes readability or a challenge to
a lively intellect.
A review of the legal writings of George Smith over the last thirty years
bears witness to several recurring themes-many of them on black letter topics
that would gladden the hearts of the most conservative ofjurists. For example,
one of his monographs is on environmental control in Arkansas.25
Environmental law, land use, and associated legal themes of nuisance law
make up his scholarly collection. So do his essays on the law of remedies, with
their examination of the mollifying impact of equity upon the common law
derived from the legal traditions of England's Court of Chancery in the United
States and Australia. George Smith has written much on property law,2 6 and
has also contributed to the literature on civil liberties, sexuality, and
jurisprudence.
However, it is in the field of health law, and in the special realm of
bioethics and the law, that George Smith has become a world-recognized
scholar of the first rank. He is much in demand as a Visiting Fellow at
universities everywhere. This demand has taken him not only to the great

20.

1 CRYONICS, L. & MED. 23 (1983).
21. The Razor's Edge of Human Bonding: Artificial Fathersand Surrogate Mothers,5 W.
NEW ENG. L. REV. 639 (1983).
22. 56 A.B.A. J. 43 (1970).
23. Through a Test Tube Darkly: Artificial Insemination and the Law,67 MICH. L. REV. 127
(1968).
24. 2 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 1-2 (1986). A bibliography of the writings of
Professor Smith from 1964-1989 may be found at 6 J.CoNTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 483-93
(1990).
25. (1970).
26. See George P. Smith, 1I, The Right to Property Law in American Constitutional Law (Apr.
1986) (paper submitted for Konrad Adenauer Foundation, Conference on German and American
Constitutional Law, Notre Dame University). See also George P. Smith, II & Griffin W. Fernandez,
The Price of Beauty: An Economic Approach to Aesthetic Nuisance, 15 HARV.ENvTL. L. REV. 53

(1991); George P. Smith, II, Nuisance Law: The Morphogenesis of an HistoricalRevisionist Theory
ofEconomic Jurisprudence,74 NEB. L. REV. 658 (1995).
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universities of his own country, but also to their counterparts in England,
Germany, Italy, Scandinavia, the Netherlands, and my own country, Australia.
George Smith and I first met in 1982 when he lectured for the first time at
the University of New South Wales in Sydney, Australia. He has since
returned there on many occasions. At the time of our first meeting, I was the
inaugural chairman of the Australian Law Reform Commission. That
Commission had then recently concluded a report on human tissue
transplantation. Professor Smith's own growing interest in the law and
bioethics, and my new-found acquaintance with its mysteries, brought us
together. Since then, we have met on every occasion that he has returned to
Australia. I have watched with fascination and admiration his remarkable
career and virtually unequaled scholarly output. He did not choose a safe area
ofthe law with perimeters chartered in the Year Books and dilemmas that had
been scrutinized for centuries. Instead, his inquisitive mind took him into the
most puzzling interface of law and modern technology; he simply could not
leave the topics alone. He cogitated, analyzed, lectured, and wrote. All the
time, the scientific and technological foundation for his studies was shifting
dramatically.
Professor Smith's first entry into law reform occurred as long ago as 1969.
In that year he served as a consultant to the New York Assembly (and later
served in the same capacity for the Pennsylvania State legislature in 1976).
The New York Assembly, with the help of Professor Smith, developed model
legislative drafting proposals concerned with what was then considered an
important issue of law and bioethics-artificial insemination donors?8 The mere
mention of this topic indicates the dynamics of scientific and technological
developments that have accompanied Professor Smith in hisjourney through
bioethics and the law. The "artificial insemination husband" had given way to
the "artificial insemination donor." The law reviews were full of the
exploration of these themes. Soon they were overtaken by human tissue
transplants. And then this was displaced by in vitro fertilization. Soon this
too was replaced by new dilemmas of artificial reproduction. Now we have
seen the creation, by reproductive cloning, of the sheep, Dolly. 9 Today, it
seems, we are on the brink of reproductive cloning of the human species.30
27. AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION, HUMAN TISSUE TRANSPLANTS (1976).
28. See O'Brien,supra note l, at 181 n.132.
29. See George P. Smith, II, Judicial Decisionmakingin the Age of Biotechnology, 13 NOTRE
DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 93, 112-16 (1999).
30. See id at 114-15. See also LAW AND HUMAN GENETICS: REGULATING A REVOLUTION 1
(Roger Brownsword et al. eds., 1998) [hereinafter LAW AND HUMAN GENETICS].
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In the space of the years of our friendship-fewer than twenty years-the
technological revolution in biology and genomics has presented problems of
ever greater magnitude and at a seemingly unstoppable pace in both number
and difficulty. How easy it would be to surrender to the pageant of truly
difficult dilemmas for ethics and the law which it presents. Most mere mortals
would do so. A law professor or a judge would turn his or her attention to
simpler and safer fields-such as taxation, legislation, or (if they were
venturesome) the law of restitution. But George Smith responded with an
energy atypical of the law and more typical of the scientific imagination
presenting the problems in the first place. He has kept pace with the most
puzzling challenges of our time. Not content with these, he has looked
searchingly into the future for other difficult problems that arejust around the
corner-such as the problems associated with acid rain 3 and the potentiality of
cryonics to give Elizabeth Taylor (and eventually the rest of us) the hope of
palpable immortality. 32 For those who laugh at these issues and call them
science fiction, not science, it is necessary to reflect upon all that has happened
in the past decades. Scientific achievement often grows out of scientific
imagination. Someone in the law should be keeping pace. More often than
not, that someone is George Smith.
With thanks for his many contributions to legal scholarship and education
in Australia and in acknowledgment of his extraordinary work over such a
sustained period, I have come to the place of his origin to help inaugurate the
Chair of Law and Legal Research, which is named for him. I am proud to
have that honor. It will be a daunting chair for its incumbents. A minimum of
8,000 words a day will be expected, and they will need to be addressed to
cutting edge issues, not to the safe backwaters of the law.

II.

SEARCHING FOR A PRINCIPLE

It is one thing to recognize the dilemmas of bioethics and law and another
to contribute to the scholarly and practical ways ofelucidating the choices that
must be made. The methodology of the common law encourages a mode of
thinking which responds to each practical problem as it arises. This pragmatic
methodology encourages the decisionmaker to move from precedent to
31. See George P. Smith, ii, Acid Rain: Transnational Perspectives, 4 N.Y.L.SCH. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 459 (1983).
32. See George P. Smith, II, Intimations of Immortality: Clones, Cryons and the Law, 6

U.N.S.W. L. J. 119(1983).
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precedent, as Lord Tennyson said, applying a past decision by analogous
reasoning when confronted with a new dilemma.
The difficulty with this methodology is nowhere more evident than in the
field of bioethics. Here, lawyers, and other policymakers, are confronted by
a number of acute and special problems. The lay observer will not always
understand, or understand fully, the scientific development that has occurred
and the technological applications that have sprung from that development.
Looking back on the twentieth century, we can perceive at least three main
scientific advances that have changed the face of our planet, namely nuclear
fission, informatics, and biogenetics. Somewhere, awaiting discovery, is a
grand theory that will explain the interconnections of all of these scientific
discoveries. It is easy enough to conceive the connections between
informatics and genetics. Unraveling the secrets ofthe human genome would
be impossible without the assistance of computers to perform the essential
analysis of the data. But as that data is presented and takes the scientist and
the technologist into even more dramatic developments, the lawyer and the
ethicist tend to be left behind. For the most part, like laymen, lawyers cannot
truly comprehend the detail of science and much less where it is leading. They
cannot keep pace with the rate of change. They cannot foresee the leaps of
scientific imagination that occur in a propulsion of ideas, and not by linear
development. Above all, they lack a general methodology which will offer a
consistent approach to the way in which the law should respond to such new
dilemmas.
Some individuals urge resort to religious dogma to solve the conundrum.
But so extraordinarily varied are the puzzles that we must now confront that
dogma is often unhelpful to the specificities of contemporary problems.
Professor Smith, himself a religious man, writes:
If the Church is largely ignored today it is not because
science has finally won its age-old battle with religion, but
because it has so radically re-oriented our society that the
biblical perspective ofthe world now seems largely irrelevant.
As one television cynic recently remarked, few of our
neighbours possess an ox or an ass for us to covet. The deep
questions of existence are approached differently by science
and religion. While science is based on both careful
observation and experimentation which in turn allow for
theories to be constructed connecting different experiences,
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religion asserts unalterable truths which cannot be modified to

accommodate changing ideas. Accordingly, the true believer
stands by his faith regardless of whether evidence may be
deduced against its efficacy. Yet for the scientist, if scientific
irregularities prove a theory to be fallacious, it will be
abandoned and a new approach adopted.33
This conclusion leads George Smith to the opinion that traditional religions
"often appear to be lacking in modem relevance in resolving both personal and
social problems. 34 Unless the law is to turn a blind eye and have nothing to
say to science, it is essential that tools must be found to providejust, efficient,
and realistic solutions to the many new problems that we must confront and
solve. No one would subscribe to a theory providing a total, universal solution
to such problems. The old common law found comfort in notions of fairness
or reasonableness. Economic rationalists will insist upon maximizing economic
freedom. Philosophers may search for ideas inherent in our very humanity.
But even this will be inadequate as the Human Genome Project presents our
species with the potential to redefine humanity and to alter the genetic makeup
of future human beings.
Searching for his own solution, Professor Smith has suggested that a basic
idea which may help us to answer the dilemmas of bioethics is the force of
human love. He regards this as the driving force of the conscious life of the
human being which makes the individual, in the words of Dr. Joseph Fletcher
of the University of Virginia, grow "in love of God and neighbor."35 This is
how George Smith expresses his fundamental principle:
Since the binding force of life is love, then it can be argued
that [humans] should endeavour to maximise a response to
love in whatever situations [they find themselves.] If an act
renders more harm than good to the individual concerned, and
to those around him, the act would properly be reviewed as
unloving. The crucial point of understanding is that a basic
cost/benefit analysis is almost always undertaken-consciously
or unconsciously. Ofcourse the methodology utilised in this
33. Smith, supra note 29, at 100.
34. Id.
35. George P. Smith, II, Quality of Life, Sanctity of Creation: Palliative or Apotheosis?, 63
NEB. L. REv. 709, 732 (1984). See also O'Brien, supra note 1, at 178.

20001

INAUGURAL LECTURE

assessment would be situational and incapable of absolute
determination. Of necessity, the basic norm or standard to be
36
used will be love.
These words resonate with the thirteenth chapter of St. Paul's first letter
to the Corinthians. In words so familiar to people of all religions, and of no
religion, the writer of that letter explains the dilemmas which bioethicist,
lawyer, and philosopher must face and how none of us is excused from the
obligation to face them:
Love never faileth: but whether there be prophecies, they
shall fail; whether there be tongues, they shall cease;
whether there be knowledge, it shall vanish away.
For we know in part, and we prophesy in part.
But when that which is perfect is come, then that which is in
part shall be done away.
When I was a child, I spake as a child, I understood as a
child, I thought as a child: but when I became a man I put
away childish things.
For now I see through a glass, darkly; but then face to face:
now I know in part; but then shall I know even as also I am
known.
And now abideth faith, hope and love, these three; but the
greatest of these is love.37
In an age when there is so much pressure to solve problems by reference
solely to economic criteria (and selfish ones at that) it is surely important to
have voices suggesting that difficult quandaries can be solved by reaching into
our capacity for love and respect for other human beings and other species.
Those we love may include human beings outside our nuclear family-those
whom we do not even know and/or those whom we know and do not fully
understand. Respect for fundamental human rights and human dignity is one
of the key movements that has grown out of the catastrophic disasters of the
twentieth century. On an otherwise dark landscape, the achievements in the
field of human rights represent bright beacons of hope as we enter a new
century. Despite some critics (many of them autocrats) who doubt the
36. O'Brien, supra note i, at 177-78.
37. 1 Corinthians 13:8.
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universality of human rights and urge a multitude of cultural exceptions, it is
important to recognize that it is the overwhelming genetic commonality ofthe
human species that stamps upon the discourse of human rights its search for
universal principles. Like Professor Smith, I have always thought that the
foundational idea behind respect for the human rights of family and strangers,
indeed of every other member of our species and beyond, is a love that we
potentially feel for them as creatures whose lives are overwhelmingly similar
to or shared with our own.
To bring these generalities to an element of specificity, I now turn to two
highly practical and somewhat urgent dilemmas ofa bioethical character, both
of which have potentially legal implications. Each of them illustrates the
inadequacy of economics as a universal principle to provide solutions to the
world's health problems. In a highly diverse world of intemational problems,
each illustrates the impossibility of offering solutions by reference to the
dogmas of particular religions. In a world of diverse religions, and of no
religion at all, it is increasingly impossible to impose worldwide solutions that
reflect the values and beliefs of one religious tradition alone. Each dilemma
also illustrates the quandary of sharing. How do we share the benefits and
burdens of important technological advances potentially affecting the health
and well-being of our species? What are the principles of distributive justice
that will help us to find the solutions for the laws and policies we should adopt?

III.

THE DILEMMA OF

HIV VACCINES

The fastest spreading new pathogen threatening life in the human species
today is the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) which ordinarily
progresses to Acquired Immuno Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS).3" In the
absence of readily available therapeutic drugs or effective vaccines, the only
remedy accessible to most societies is behavior modification. As any lawyer
can tell, from millennia of experience with the law, changing the behavior of
people in conduct that is pleasurable and important to identity (including sexual
and drug use), is most imperfect. If change occurs at all, it is extremely slow
and intermittent. For any degree of effectiveness, it is necessary, in the case
of HIV, to challenge entrenched religious, moral, social, and other sources of
resistance. Nevertheless, because it is estimated that every day 16,000 new
HIV infections occur, there is enormous pressure to secure an effective
38. See Despite Necessity of Behavioral Research, Vaccines Only Real Hope, AIDS Official
Says, AIDS POL'Y & L., Sept. 30, 1994, at I.
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vaccine, particularly in developing countries devastated by the virus. This is
said to be, in most developing countries, the only "realistic" way to deal with
the epidemic.39 It is why in recent years there has been a renewed
commitment by government leaders, including in the United States, for the
development of HIV vaccines.' One health minister from a developing nation
afflicted by the epidemic observed: "If you don't get on with this soon...
there will be no one left to protect."' Even a low efficacy, limited-impact
vaccine (in places where the spread of HIV is rapid) protecting some of the
individuals at primary risk to the spread of the virus would, according to
mathematical population models, have a huge impact on the spread of HIV.42
HIV/AIDS presents particular challenges to vaccine development. It has
been exactly 200 years since Edward Jenner released his study on the first
vaccine known to humanity, that against smallpox."3 One by one, other
conditions have responded to immunization: yellow fever, plague, polio,
diphtheria, tetanus, typhoid, whooping cough, rabies, and measles. Most of
these conditions are produced by bacteria (such as typhoid) or by a
comparatively stable virus (such as smallpox). The challenges of HIV/AIDS
stem from the mutations of HIV, the multiple strains in which the virus
manifests itself, and the social context in which those affected have to live and
work.
George Smith's principle of love requires us to face squarely this bioethical
dilemma. It necessitates recognition of the fact that not to act is often to
make an ethical decision. Not to invest in HIV vaccines, but to do so in
genetic cures for wrinkles because that would be more profitable, is to make
an ethical choice. Not to press on with medical testing and trials for fear of
the legal risks they may involve is to make such a choice. To conduct the trials
only in developing countries may seem a sensible course because of political
pressure, strong governmental support, the ease of securing local participants,
and the unlikelihood of legal proceedings if things go wrong; but, this too
involves an ethical election.
Trials of HIV vaccines in the United States have been discontinued
because everyone knows that legal liability for mishaps would be scrupulously
39. Id. at I (quoting Dr. William Paul, Director of the Office of AIDS Research, National
Institutes of Health).
40. KEITH ALCORN, AIDS REFERENCE MANUAL 280 (1998-99).

41. Christine Grady, HIV Preventive Vaccine Research, 19 J.MED. & PHIL. 595, 599 (1994).
42. See ALCORN, supra note 40, at 284.
43. See EDWARD JENNER, AN INQUIRY INTO THE CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF THE VARIOLEA
VACCINAE (1798).
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enforced in the courts." Yet, the shift of trials to developing countries where
such risks are minimal presents new problems.4" These arise, in part, from the
fact that the market for HIV vaccines that would render the investment
profitable is largely in the developed world where strains of the virus may be
different. Furthermore, there is an increasing recognition that the conduct of
such trials in developing countries must allow the people who take part in them,
and the nations that facilitate them, to reap a just return-"the vaccine
dividend"-if the trial goes ahead and later a commercially viable vaccine
emerges as a result.
Three principles should govern the conduct of prophylactic or therapeutic
research into HIV involving human beings. Those principles include: (1)
respect for the persons involved, their autonomy in decisionmaking, and selfdetermination; (2) beneficence-maximizing benefits and minimizing harms to
such persons; and (3) distributive justice-equitable distribution of both the
burdens and benefits of participation in research.4 6 In common law countries
we are quite familiar with the first two principles. We protect the individual.
We insist upon beneficence. We do so in the decisions of the courts which
demand that patient consent be truly informed and that the onlyjustification for
medical intervention (which would otherwise be an assault or trespass upon the
person) is the purpose of those involved to secure the best interests of the
patient.47
It is the principle of'distributivejustice that makes the ethical decisions in
a field such as the development of HIV vaccines somewhat different from the
ordinary ethical choices the law enforces. In this dilemma, the ultimate
question is: What is in it for the people of Uganda or Thailand who are
submitted to an HIV vaccine trial that we do not conduct upon people in the
44. See U.S. Code of Federal Regulations 45 CFR 46.116(4) ("the subject must be 'informed
of appropriate alternative procedures or course of treatment if any that may be advantageous to
the subject"') and 45 CFR 46.111(2) ("the risks to subjects [must be] reasonable in relation to the
anticipated benefits, if any, to subjects and the importance of the knowledge that may reasonably
be expected to result"). See also Grady, supra note 41, at 607.
45. U. Schqklenk, The Ethics of Clinical AIDS Vaccine Trials in Developing Countries-A
Critical Commentary, 13 MONASH BIOETHICS REv. 13 (1994) (criticizing N. Christakis, The Ethical
Design of an AIDS Vaccine Trial in Africa 18(3) HASTINGS CENTER REPORT 31 (1988)).

46. See Joe Thomas, Ethical Challenges of HIV Clinical Trials in Developing Countries, 12
BIOETHICS 320, 322 (1998).
47. B. N. Dickens, Legal Approaches to Healthcare Ethics and the Four Principles, in
PRINCIPLES OF HEALTHCARE ETHICS 305, 308 (R. Gillon ed.,

1994), referring to Kruzan v.

Director, Missouri Department of Health 10 S. Ct. 2841 (1990); Sidaway v. Bethlem Royal
Hospital [1985] 1 AC 871. See also Schloendorffv. Society of New York Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125
(1914); Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
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developed world whose pharmaceutical companies have developed the
vaccine? In addition, what can, and should, law and policymakers in developed
countries do to address the issues of distributivejustice which the trial ofHIV
vaccines necessarily raises?
Past experience with the conduct of trials for medical purposes has taught
the need for great vigilance. The Tuskegee study in the United States denied
newly developed penicillin to indigenous victims of syphilis even after that drug
was widely available throughout the country. 8 Subsequent revelations also
showed how human subjects were radiated without their awareness of the
dangerous risks to which they were being exposed.4 9 In the case of HIV,
there is a possibility (I put it no higher) that, because of its high volatility, the
virus may "unattenuate." An attenuated strain involving dead virus might
come back to life to threaten a person vaccinated with it.50 Although, in
accordance with standard procedures, clinical trials on animal subjects must
first be exhausted, 5 the point is reached when it becomes scientifically
essential to conduct a clinical trial on human subjects. At this point, risks must
be measured. These trials must be taken with a clear appreciation of the
urgency that faces humanity in relationship to this disease. It is also necessary
to ensure that there is a sharing of benefits and burdens. In short, people in
far-away developing countries should not be reduced to the status of objects.
It is the ethical, and should be the legal, duty of individuals and corporations in
developed countries to make sure that scientists and entrepreneurs proceed in
a way that respects the basic human rights and human dignity of the trial group
and the communities in which such trials take place.
Ethical principles require that those who participate in an HIV vaccine trial
must be alerted, counseled, and reinforced in the lessons of behavior
modification. At the moment, this represents the only certain means of
preventing sero-conversion. Trial subjects must not put their faith in the
vaccine with which they are being tested. Whether they receive the
experimental product or a placebo, they must be constantly reminded about
self-protection. Yet paradoxically, the effectiveness of any HIV trial will only
be proved if some of the participants do not receive, or ignore, such messages
and become infected. 2 In this sense, those involved in HIV vaccine trials
48. See David B. Resnik, The Ethics of HIV Research in Developing Nations, 12 BIOEThICS
286, 301 (1998).
49. Id. at 306.
50. See Vaccine for AIDS, ECONOMIST, July 4-10, 1998, at 81.
51. See Grady, supra note 41, at 598.
52. S. Kippax and J. Crawford, Prophylactic Vaccine Trials: What is Different About HIP', 8
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have, potentially, an operational interest in the sero-conversion of some of
those receiving the placebo. They also have an operational interest in the
exposure to risk of those who do receive the vaccine product. I do not, of
course, suggest a desire that others become infected or a cold indifference
to that possibility. Instead, I merely call to notice the operational necessities
of any drug or vaccine trial.
In vaccine trials that are not life threatening (mumps, measles, and so
on),53 such potential conflicts of interest and duty may be tolerable. Where
HIV/AIDS is concerned, the highest possible vigilance and strict scrutiny of
the trial is required. The World Bank and international initiatives of the United
Nations interagency, Joint United Nations Program on AIDS (UNAIDS), are
addressing these truly global dilemmas. Because HIV is a virus ofthe human
species and because it is spread rapidly by a movement of people to every part
of the world, very few communities are completely immune from its
devastation. In providing a response, it is not enough for the law to attempt to
impose barriers at the frontier-they will not work. Law, to be ethical, should
support vaccine trials and the international efforts to conduct them. Yet, if
such trials are to take place, potentially for the benefit of people in other lands,
distributivej ustice suggests the need to protect those who take part in the trial,
to defend them if the trial fails, and to reward them if the trial produces a
commercially viable vaccine.
These principles can be stated in general terms. George Smith would
doubtless explain that they have their ultimate foundation in the love and
respect that we should share for every creature who partakes of the humanity
that is also our own. Legal regulation should not be so onerous as to
discourage still further the investment in vaccine development, trials, and
marketing that are essential to any effective and global scientific response to
the AIDS epidemic. Yet, distributivejustice requires that attention be given
to individuals who submit to trials in other lands. If, ultimately, there are
successful HIV vaccines, they will represent a commercial bonanza. In that
event, what is the reward that will be shared with those whose risk-taking
made it possible? Has the law a role to ensure that these individuals benefit
directly from their contribution?

VENEREOLOGY 178, 179 (1995).
53. See Grady, supra note 41, at 598-608.
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IV. THE GENOME AND BENEFIT SHARING

The Human Genome Project (Project) is the largest cooperative scientific
enterprise in history. It involves the mapping ofthe human genome comprising
approximately 100,000 genes that determine the genetic makeup of each
human being. The Project, which is ahead of schedule, is expected to be
completed in the year 2003. Even when the location of the genes in the
structure of the human DNA is known, the function of most of them will, for
the time being, remain unknown. 4 Scientists will have a great mass of data.
It has been likened to "a very large encyclopedia written in an unknown
language."55 The hope of this Project is that the functions of all of the genes
will eventually provide knowledge that will help medical science to treat more
than 4,000 genetic diseases, which presently afflict humanity, as well as many
other diseases in which genetic predisposition plays an important role.
It is not my present purpose to identify even the main ethical and legal
quandaries that the Human Genome Project presents.5 6 The United Nations
Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Universal
Declaration on Human Rights and the Human Genome" bases its approach
upon the requirement of defending human dignity and the common heritage of
humanity. These objectives are sometimes explained by reference to
Immanual Kant's second formulation of the categorical imperative. This
formulation instructs that one should "act in such a way that you always treat
humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never
simply as a means but always at the same time as an end."
Mutations or variations in the human genome may be important to the
discovery of therapies that will be developed from the scientific research.
They may result in drugs that have the potential to be highly profitable. Take
two examples, not wholly theoretical:
54. See Lee Rowen et al., Sequencing the Human Genome, SCIENCE, Oct. 24, 1997, at 605;
G. D. Schuler et al., A Gene Map of the Human Genome, SCIENCE, Oct. 25, 1996, at 540. See also
J.Kinderlerer & D. Longley, Human Genetics: The New Panacia?, 16 Mod. L. Rev. 603 (1998).
55. See Kinderlerer & Longley, supra note 54, at 604.
56. See LAW AND HUMAN GENETICS, supra note 30; George P. Smith, 11, Harnessing the
Human Genome Through Legislative Constraint, 5 EUR.J. HEALTH L. 53 (1998); George P. Smith,
11 & Thaddeus Bums, Genetic Determinism or Genetic Discrimination?, 11 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH
L. & POL'Y 23 (1994).
57. UNESCO Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the Human Genome, Nov. 11,
1997, (visited Feb. 24, 2000) <http://www.nnesco.org/ibc/uk/genome/project/index.html>.
58. IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 209 (Mary Gregor ed. & trans.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1996) (1797). See also D. Beyleveld and R. Brownsword, Human Dignity,
Human Rights and Human Genetics, 61 MOD. L. REv. 661, 665-67 (1998).
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(1) Research on prostate enlargement has led to a study of particular
families, many of them in developing countries, which have
manifested an apparent immunity resulting in the natural
development of an inhibitor against prostate enlargement. Ifthe
development of the steroid appearing in this group of human
beings could be isolated, it could ultimately be of great benefit in
the treatment of prostate enlargement in the general population of
many countries. This is a common human ailment. If
pharmaceutical companies, seeking to protect large investments
in the research and development that may produce medications
for such treatment seek the protection of patents over their
discovery, should such protection be available to them? If so, for
how long? Should rewards be paid in the event that a medication
results in large profits to the pharmaceutical company? If so, to
whom should the rewards be paid? To the individual from whose
genetic particularity the treatment was refined? At least in
developing countries, to the village of such donors or to their tribe
or social group? Orto their nation so that it can be ploughed back
into the medical treatment of others for both prostate enlargement
59
and other conditions?
(2) Researchers from a developed country, studying the genetics of
nicotine dependence take samples from patients in an isolated
village in China. As a condition for the award of a research
grant, they bank their samples permanently. The researchers
make them available, on request, without charge to other
researchers, including commercial entities. They do not provide
the names of the individual donors. The researchers find several
promising genetic markers for nicotine dependence in the
samples. Later, a pharmaceutical company using the samples
discovers a gene associated with these markers. After many
years of research and development, the company produces an
immensely profitable drug to combat nicotine addiction in the
human species. Does the company owe anything in these
circumstances to the original donors in China if they could be
found? To the original researchers? To the village or ethnic

59. ETHics COMMIrMEE, HUMAN GENOME ORGANIZATION, GENOME-BENEFIT SHARING, para.

6 (forthcoming 2000) [hereinafter HUGO ETHics COMMITTEE].
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group of the donors? To China as a country? Does any principle
of benefit sharing require the provision of benefits to these
individuals, groups, or nations? If so, is it provided for reasons of
justice? Or possibly for reasons of prudence to avoid political,
economic, or other opposition? Or as charity, out of the pocket
of the rich into the pocket of the poor?60
These are the questions being examined by the Ethics Committee of the
Human Genome Organization. The answers given will not be found in the
teachings of any particular religion. These questions are addressed to the
whole world, with its multitude of religions, philosophies, and beliefs. The
answers will draw upon the international guidelines that have been developed
by the World Health Organization 6' (WHO) and other bodies. As in all
bioethical reflections, it is necessary to approach the quandaries from a
thorough understanding of the practical environment in which they arise.
Some human diseases such as river blindness and sleeping sickness appear
virtually exclusively in poor developing countries. The WHO estimates that
more than fifty-six billion U.S. dollars is spent globally each year on health
research. However, less than ten percent of that sum concerns diseases
which afflict ninety percent of the world's population. Multinational
pharmaceutical corporations do not ordinarily invest in new products unless
they offer the promise of large and preferably prompt returns.
Turning a gleam in a researcher's eye into a handful of useful
pills is an expensive and time-consuming business: on
average, it costs $300 million and takes more than a decade.
Between 1975 and 1997, an impressive 1,223 new [medical]
compounds were launched on the market. But... only 11 of
them were designed for tropical diseases.6 2
Already, particular national groups have begun to negotiate arrangements
by which there is a trade-off between the group participating in a genetic trial
60. Id.
61. See HUMAN

GENETICS PROGRAMME, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, PROPOSED
INTERNATIONAL GUIDELINES ON ETHICAL ISSUES IN MEDICAL GENETICS AND GENETIC SERVICES
(1998). See also WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, Proposed International Guidelines on Ethical

Issues in Medical Genetics and Genetic Services (visited Feb. 27, 2000) <http://www.who.org/
ned/hgn/hgnethic.htm>.
62. Balms for the Poor, ECONOMIST, Aug. 14, 1999, at 71.
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and the pharmaceutical company conducting it. In February, 1998, HoffmanLa Roche, Switzerland, agreed to an arrangement for a contribution to the
government of Iceland of 200 million U.S. dollars over five years. During that
time, the company will study the genes and alleles (or mutations) that
predispose Icelandic people to the development of up to twelve common
diseases. These diseases include four cardiovascular diseases, four
psychiatric-neurologic diseases, and four metabolic diseases. The project is
called "deCode." It has been described by its supporters as "the first example
of recognition ofthe patient population contribution to the drug discovery by a
pharmaceutical company."
Under deCode, Icelanders "will receive
medications developed for their contribution free of charge."
Although there has been some opposition within Iceland and elsewhere to
the scheme, the project has been fully developed in the Icelandic community
and decided in the democratically-elected Parliament of Iceland. Decisions
have been made by the community through its legislature to accept the bargain
with the pharmaceutical company. Its supporters present deCode as a modern
example of benefit sharing.63 There are similar developments in other
countries. However, for the most part, developing countries and the
governments, tribes, villages, and individuals in them who participate in such
trials are less well-positioned than the representatives and people of Iceland
to insist that they should share the benefit of research and gain the "genomic
dividend" if the study oftheir mutations produces therapeutic or prophylactic
medicines, which are of benefit to human health and profitable to the
companies that market them.
In a partial response to these developments, the World Bank and WHO,
together with a number of donor countries and philanthropic organizations,
have formed the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization. The object
of this body is to improve access to existing vaccines in developing countries
and to support the development of new vaccines." The program envisages
"contingent lending" by which donors in developed countries will afford capital
on the basis that needy countries will agree to purchase the vaccine if and
when a useful one appears. Since December, 1998, the Gates Foundation has
63. See, e.g., Ragnheidur Haraldsdottir, Letter to the Editor, Iceland's Central Database of
Health Records, 283 SCIENCE 487 (1999) (Haraldsottir is the Deputy Permanent Secretary,
Ministry of Health and Social Security, Reykjavik, Iceland.); Michael Specter, Decoding Iceland,
NEW YORKER, Jan. 18, 1999, at 40-42. For recommendations of the Human Genome Organisation
(HUGO) Ethics Committee, see Statement on the Principled Conduct of Genetics Research (last
modified Sept. 23, 1998) <http://www.gene.ucl.ac.uk/hugo/conduct.htm>.
64. Balms for the Poor, supra note 62, at 71.
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provided fifty million U.S. dollars for malaria vaccine development, twentyfive million U.S. dollars for HIV/AIDS vaccine research programs, and 100
million U.S. dollars for global children's vaccine programs. The children's
vaccine programs aim to improve access to expensive new vaccines against
hepatitis B and the influenza virus. International developments ofthese kinds,
both within global institutions and by private bodies, assist in sharing the
benefits of international medical research, including that derived from the
Human Genome Project. 65 The law is not irrelevant to these developments.
The reform of intellectual property law (encompassing patents and copyright)
and the enactment of legislation which ensures that domestic corporations,
subject to local law, conform to basic norms of individual and distributive
justice, represent ways by which George Smith's principle of love for fellow
human beings, wherever they are, may be reflected in the ethical decisions to
which such laws give effect.
CONCLUSION

George Smith has frequently made the point that, at least in common law
countries, there is always a potential legal decisionmaker who will solve
dilemmas and provide binding norms. Where a problem is presented involving
serious disagreement, there is never a legal gap. Although the legislative and
executive branches of government may fail or run away from such dilemmas,
this is not a privilege open tojudges in a properly constituted suit. Judges must
find a solution, even if this involves making new law by analogical reasoning
from past judicial decisions. In a recent essay, Professor Smith quoted
Professor Roger Dworkin to explain the limitations inherent in judge-made
solutions:"
Common lawjudges have no power to issue advisory opinions
or proffer generalised codes of conduct. They have no
power to rule for the future even about problems that seem
certain to arise. This means that for the common law to deal
with technology the technology must exist and have operated
in a way that angered someone enough for that person to
have claimed injury and sought legal redress. Thus, to the
65. See HUGO ETHicS COMMITTEE, supra note 59, para. 32.
66. ROGER B. DWORKIN, LIMITS: THE ROLE OF THE LAW IN BIOETHICAL DECISION MAKING

9 (1996), noted in Smith, supranote 29, at 99.

444

INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES

[Vol. 7:425

extent that a rapid response or response in advance of a biosocial development is important, the common law cannot
provide it. Common law is reactive, not proactive.
Dilemmas ofbioethics can sometimes elicit solutions to complex problems
from distracted and nervous lawmakers. In 1997, President Clinton banned
the use of federal funds for human cloning.6 7 Subsequently, he settled on a
five-year moratorium.68 Later still, the National Bioethics Advisory
Commission ofthe United States recommended federal legislation be enacted
to allow a limited number of scientists to create cloned human embryos for a
limited time for further scientific research aimed to benefit humanity. The
Commission suggested that the use of such embryos for human reproduction
be prohibited.69
Ultimately, one could imagine cases coming before the courts in which
many of the dilemmas presented by genetic and genomic science have to be
solved. An individual or group affected in a foreign country may sue a local
corporation for breach of proper standards in the conduct of an HIV trial.
Individuals concerned may seek redress for the use without authority of their
genetic materials in the development of a therapy or vaccine. Claims to
distributivejustice, as well as individual entitlements, may come to engage the
judiciary in the future. Certainly, these claims will require the attention, and
properly so, of the legislative and the executive branches. When this occurs,
it will be important for decisionmakers to have guidance from those who have
thought deeply about these issues, identified the scope and nature of the
questions, and explored some of the answers. At this time, it is certain that the

67. See Rick Weiss, Human Clone Research Will Be Regulated, WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 1998,
at Al. Bills S. 368 and H.R. 922 of the 105th Congress seek a permanent ban of federal funding
for human cloning. But H.R. 923 seeks to impose an outright ban on human cloning. See Smith,
supra note 29, at115-16.

68. See Guy Gugliotta, United Against Human Cloning, Hill Leaders Differ on Specifics, WASH.
POST, Feb. 4,1998, at A4.
69. See Rick Weiss, PanelBacks Some Human Clone Work, WASH. POST, June 4, 1997, at Al.
In 1997, California became the first state in the United States to legislate a prohibition on
reproductive cloning of a human being. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 24185 (West Supp.
2000). A five-year moratorium was imposed on human experimentation in cloning, and heavy civil
penalties were imposed for violation. See id §§ 24185, 24187, 24189.
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writings of Professor Smith, as a "prescient prophet of the New Biology,' 70
will be in the forefront of the thinking of the decisionmaker.
George Smith holds up the light of his scholarship to the rest of us. He
sheds light into dark and mysterious places, where the darkness threatens to
encircle us and the mysteries deepen and multiply into a gloom. 7' For this we
must be grateful. To say so, I have crossed the world to express the gratitude
of many outside the United States. Professor Smith should continue to cajole,
stimulate, irritate, and aggravate us. He should continue to seize our attention
and to present us with the great puzzles of our time. Given the changes that
have come about in the thirty years of scholarship and the acceleration of
change we have witnessed, we will need him and others like him to apply
human intelligence to great issues as we enter this new century where the
dilemmas will only become more difficult.
Can our democratic law-making institutions survive these challenges? Or
will our institutions remain as often-irrelevant relics of an earlier, simpler age?
That is the fundamental question which bioethics presents to the law.
Professor George Smith, son of Indiana University, is not content to walk away
from such questions. He shows the obligation, and the means, to respond. But
will we have the imagination and the courage to follow?
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